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THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE 
"The essence of the knowledge is, having it, to apply it; not having it, to 
confess your ignorance. Ignorance is the night of the mind, but a night 
without moon or star". 
 
Confucius. 
"It is not the degree that makes a great man; it is the man that 
makes the degree great" 
 
Nicoli Machiavelli. 
   
The Economic Development Institute under the theme Global Thinking Research was 
established in 2001. We are group of past students of the University of the West Indies 
living in and outside Jamaica. We came to the realization from when we were on the 
Mona Campus that in the Information Age we live in, successful people are those who 
have access to information. We formed a group to share in this New Way of Thinking 
and found it fruitful to our endeavours . Unfortunately, we had to restrict our 
information bases in many cases as our lecturers and tutors deemed it fit to remain in a 
vacuum of limitation with regards to the evolution of the New Information Paradigm. 
We were clearly ahead of our time.  We have developed this new product called the 
Information Booklet Series (which there is a need for), the product provides 
information on topical issues in the areas of Management, Sports, Information 
Technology, Public Administration, Information and Communication, Economics, 
Economic Development, Social Development, Legal Education, Industrial Relations at 
competitive prices. We have kept it simple so that all can understand and appreciate. As 
such, we do not regard them as theses on the chosen areas and they do not seek 
academic recognition, however they do meet WIPO (World Intellectual Property 
Organization) Standards. We hope you will find the following informative and instructive 
and as usual your comments would be appreciated. 
Peter W. Jones 




We would like to thank the Office of The Prime Minister for their assistance. In addition the Office 





￿I want to say very, very clearly that the decision to abolish appeals to the Privy 
Council was not born out of anything to do with capital punishment. The idea was 
first mooted in 1970, based on a very simple principle that you cannot be a sovereign 
nation with the interpretation of your laws being done externally. Laws have to reflect 
the customs and traditions of the people,￿   
 
￿We live in a new world.  The world in 2003 is a different world from 1953.  The 
powerful nations of the world have grown more powerful￿Many no longer remember 
how they became powerful in the first place, what was the exploitation of the 
resources of the colonial world and of the people from the colonial world. We know 
what Jamaicans did and what people from the Caribbean did to rebuild the United 
Kingdom after the last World War.  But let me tell you something, in today￿s world 
you can￿t rely on that,￿ 
 
￿I have no problem when English judges are interpreting English laws to suit English 
traditions and customs, but I have a great problem when English judges are 
interpreting laws passed by a sovereign Jamaican Parliament, It￿s the business of a 
sovereign Jamaica to decide on its laws and it cannot be the business of external 
judges to make laws for Jamaica by the process of judicial interpretation,￿     8
 
Most Honourable P.J.  Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica  speaking on February 
27, 2003 at a meeting of the Jamaican community in the United Kingdom (UK), at the 
Jamaican High Commission.  
 
 
￿￿￿.As Prime Minister at that time, this was the perspective in which the 
Government of Jamaica saw the proposed regional court.  We did not view it with 
disfavour, provided a mechanism could be devised to ensure that Judges would be so 
appointed as to be entirely free of political connections to ensure that their 
independence would not be in question.￿ 
 
￿  I  expressed  this  view  as  Prime  Minister  at  that  time  and,  had  conditions  not 
changed drastically, I would perhaps have held the same view today. 
However, times have changed, indeed, drastically so￿￿￿.￿ 
 
￿￿￿.The economic climate of 15 years ago, no longer prevails.  There was certainty 
and  predictability,  robust  economic  growth,  relatively  stable  social  conditions  in 
which crime was not of epidemic proportions and the justice system worked.  Today, 
each of these conditions have now been reversed.  The economy is out of control; the 
society  has  been  destabilized  by  fear  and  the  criminal  justice  system  has  broken 
down.￿ 
 
Most Honorable Edward Seaga, Leader of The Opposition, speaking in CCJ Debate, 
Parliament, May 2003 
..I am yet to be persuaded that it is quite in order to build a judicial 
superstructure entitled the Caribbean Court of Justice, which envisages the abolition 
of the Privy Council as the final appellate authority, but leaves the base, the 
Magisterial Courts' system in shambles. The ordinary folk in the Caribbean seek   9
judicial redress at the Magistrates' Court in over ninety 
percent of the cases." 
Hon. Ralph Gonsalves, Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, in 
addressing the opening ceremony of the twenty-second meeting of the conference of 
Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community July 2001 
 
 
ANSWERS TO YOUR BURNING QUESTIONS ON THE CCJ 
 
What is the Caribbean Court of Justice ? 
 
The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is the proposed regional judicial tribunal to be established by 
the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice. It has a long gestation period 
commencing in 1970 when the Jamaican delegation at the Sixth Heads of Government Conference, 
which convened in Jamaica, proposed the establishment of a Caribbean Court of Appeal in 
substitution for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 
 How is the proposed Caribbean Court of Justice different from the 
Caribbean Court of  Appeal proposed by Jamaica at the sixth heads of 
government conference? 
 
The Caribbean Court of Justice has been designed to be more than a court of last resort for Member 
States of the Caribbean Community. For, in addition to replacing the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council, the CCJ will be vested with an original jurisdiction in respect of the interpretation and 
application of the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community. In effect, the CCJ would exercise 
both an appellate and an original jurisdiction. 
How is the appellate jurisdiction different from the original 
jurisdiction ? 
  
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ will consider and determine appeals in both civil 
and criminal matters from common law courts within the jurisdictions of Member states of the 
Community and which are parties to the Agreement Establishing the CCJ. In the discharge of its 
appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ will be the highest municipal court in the Region. In the exercise of its   10
original jurisdiction, the CCJ will be discharging the functions of an international tribunal applying 
rules of international law in respect of the interpretation and application of the Treaty. In this regard, 
the CCJ would be performing functions like the European Court of Justice, the European Court of 
First Instance, the Andean Court of Justice and the International Court of Justice. In short, the 
proposed CCJ is intended to be a hybrid institution - a municipal court of last resort and an 
international court with compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the interpretation and 
application of the Treaty.  
 
Is there general agreement on the establishment of the Caribbean 
Court of Justice? 
 
 
No! Opinions are divided on the need for, or desirability of, the Caribbean Court of Justice. 
Opposition to the CCJ appears to be informed by various considerations. One such consideration is 
suspicion of the unknown and professional resistance to change which is, more often than not, 
reinforced by the vigour of inertia. Some members of the legal community also entertain legitimate 
reservations about the ability and willingness of Member States of the Caribbean Community to 
provide adequate funding for the Court on a sustainable basis. Other stakeholders question the 
likelihood of the CCJ attracting to its benches judges of the required expertise and legal erudition to 
inspire confidence among members of the legal community and litigants generally. Some of these 
considerations have been addressed below. Proponents of the Court perceive of this institution as 
completing the independence of Commonwealth Caribbean States. Other supporters of the Court 
consider that an indigenous Court consisting of regional judges is best suited to pronounce on issues 
of regional importance and, in so doing, contribute to the development of a regional jurisprudence. 
 
THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE 
 
Why does the Region need its own court of last resort for civil and 
criminal matters? 
The simple answer is to ensure autonomy of judicial determinations in the Region in order to 
complete the process of independence. However, on a more pragmatic basis, for the laws of the 
Region to inspire confidence and ensure voluntary compliance, they should mirror the collective   11
social ethos of our peoples and, to be relevant and responsive, should be interpreted and applied by 
Judges who would have internalised the values informing the content of that collective social ethos. 
 But is it not reasonable to assume that the Judges of the Privy Council 
being removed from the social environment are likely to be more 
dispassionate in interpreting and applying the law? 
 
Yes! And herein lies the problem! Law is not a static corpus of abstract normative principles to be 
applied mechanistically in order to arrive at objectively valid solutions to resolve problems of human 
intercourse. Law is the normative outcome of the cut and thrust of human interactions based on 
collectively determined or generally accepted social values and subject to a process of continuing 
adjustment to its environment of control. Consequently, persons interpreting and applying the law 
should be attuned to the relevant dynamics of social interaction, which determine the quality and 
intensity of human intercourse, and the values conditioning such dynamics. And by this is meant the 
values that make us cry; the values that make us laugh; the values that make us happy or sad; the 
values that make us responsible, productive, creative, caring, proud people. In short, the values that 
condition our uniqueness as a people. In the premises, to be far removed from the immediate 
environment of social interaction to which the law applies would facilitate a dispassionate analysis of 
human events and judicially objective decisions but only to the detriment of desirable social 
behaviour and social cohesion. 
Would the Judges of the CCJ be vulnerable to political manipulation? 
 
It is generally accepted in our societies that independence of the judiciary is a vital and essential 
ingredient of the rule of law, a basic principle of social engineering in CARICOM Member States. 
To ensure independence of the members of the Court, appropriate provisions have been elaborated in 
the Agreement Establishing the CCJ to provide for credible institutional arrangements.  
Firstly, unlike the situation with the European Court of Justice, where Judges are appointed by the 
Ministers of Government, Judges of the CCJ are to be appointed by a Regional Judicial and Legal 
Services Commission whose composition should offer a reasonable degree of comfort to the Court's 
detractors. Of its nine members, four are appointed on the recommendations of the legal fraternity; 
two are to be chairpersons of national judicial services commissions, one is to be a chairperson of a 
national public service commission, one is to be the Secretary-General or his Deputy and the other is 
to be the President of the Court.  
Provisions of the draft Agreement also address the security of tenure of Judges. Removal of Judges 
from office requires an affirmative recommendation of a tribunal established for the purpose. The   12
President of the Court is appointed by the Heads of Government of participating States on the 
recommendation of the Commission and may be removed for cause only on the recommendation of 
the Commission acting on the advice of a tribunal established for the purpose. The Judges of the 
European Court of Justice, as indicated above, and the European Court of First Instance, are 
appointed by the Ministers of Government and those of the Andean Court of Justice are elected by 
States. In effect, the Caribbean Community is the only Integration Movement whose Judges are not 
directly appointed or elected by States! 
 But are not the Judges of the Court paid by Governments which can 
exert decisive informal pressure on them to deliver self-serving 
judgments? 
 
In order to preempt this eventuality, the Heads of Government have mandated the Ministers of 
Finance to provide funding for the recurrent expenses of the Court for the first five years of its 
opeation. In this connection, it should be noted that significant capital expenses have been assumed 
by the host Government and that the building for the seat of the CCJ is being provided by Trinidad 
and Tobago.  
During this initial period, a Trust Fund is to be established and capitalised in an adequate amount so 
as to enable the recurrent expenditure of the Court to be financed by income from the Fund. The 
Fund is to be administered by the Caribbean Development Bank or some other agreed institution. In 
this way, the recurrent expenditure of the Court including the remuneration of the Judges would not 
be dependent on the capricious disposition of Governments.  
Contributions to the Trust Fund should not be a cause of anxiety Extra-regional interests have 
genuine, legitimate concerns about the functioning of the CCJ. Remember, that as a court of last 
resort, the CCJ would be pronouncing on the operations of international criminal cartels whose 
activities impact adversely on the economies of third States. The CARICOM Secretariat has had 
indications of interest in contributing to the Fund from sections of the international donor community  
Most importantly, the political directorate have agreed that non-payment of contributions to the 
budget of the Court would result in the denial of access to its services by defaulting Member 
Governments. Agreement by Member States of the Community on such a sanction must be seen as a 
very significant development in the history of the economic integration movement where, 
historically, sanctions tended to be conspicuous by their absence! 
Is there any plausible assurance that the judicial pronouncements 
from the CCJ would be of the desired quality? 
   13
In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the selection of Judges would not be confined to 
the Caribbean region. Candidates may come from any territory of the Commonwealth. And having 
cast the net so widely, there is a plausible assurance that Judges of the required expertise and legal 
erudition would come forward for appointment. In any event, critics from the legal community 
expressing misgivings about the quality of judges should not forget that, in the final analysis, the 
quality of judicial determinations is not unrelated to the quality of submissions by Counsel.  
Indeed, the record would confirm that behind any sound judicial pronouncement in the Region, and 
there are numerous of them, the submissions of Counsel were very well researched, informed and 
persuasive in respect of both issues of law and fact. Finally, some comfort must be taken from the 
fact that most appeals to the Privy Council are dismissed underscoring the quality of judicial 
determinations of local Judges. 
Does the renewed interest in the establishment of the Caribbean Court 
of Justice have anything to do with the decision of the Privy Council in 
"Pratt and Morgan"? 
 
The unfortunate coincidence of those events is a matter of grave concern. However, the answer must 
be in the negative and should be placed in historical perspective. What is often forgotten by 
detractors of the Court is that the revived interest in the Caribbean Supreme Court or Caribbean 
Court of Justice, as it is now called, had its origin in the Report of the West Indian Commission 
(1992) which predated the landmark decision of the Privy Council in Pratt and Morgan (1993)by one 
year.  
Indeed, the recommendation for the establishment of a Caribbean Supreme Court in substitution for 
the Privy Council and vested with original jurisdiction concerning the interpretation and application 
of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, even though one of the most seminal determinations of the West 
Indian Commission, was anticipated twenty years before by the Representative Committee of 
OCCBA set up to examine the establishment of a Caribbean Court of Appeal in substitution for the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In short, if Pratt and Morganwas a watershed in Caribbean 
jurisprudence, the West Indian Commission's recommendation for a Caribbean Supreme Court was 
not an innovation in Caribbean judicial institutional development and is largely unrelated to popular 
perceptions of required sanctions for socially deviant behaviour.  
In point of fact, one of the most compelling arguments for the establishment of the Caribbean Court 
of Justice is the need to have an authoritative, regional institution to interpret and apply the Treaty, as 
amended, in order to create the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.But, unfortunately, the 
original jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice and its importance for the success of the   14
CSME is little understood and even less appreciated by many members of the legal fraternity at the 
present time. 
Why does the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice 
provide for withdrawal from the regime thereby conveying a 
perception of political convenience and impermanence? 
 
It is trite international law that treaties must be observed in good faith (pacta sunt servanda). 
However, in exceptional cases, such as a fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus), 
a State may, as an attribute of sovereignty and in the national interest, withdraw from a treaty regime 
irrespective of the provisions of the relevant instrument, subject, of course, to the engagement of any 
international responsibility that may be involved. As such, provisions inhibiting withdrawal from an 
international regime is of marginal juridical significance. And the same observations hold good for 
the Agreement Establishing the Seat of the Caribbean Court of Justice. 
Would the retention of appeals to the Privy Council inspire foreign 
investor confidence, especially in the case of large investments, thereby 
facilitating a better investment climate? 
 
 There can be no doubt that credibility of the judicial sector reinforces investor confidence and 
promotes foreign direct investment. Undoubtedly, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has an 
international reputation for sound judgments and does inspire investor confidence. However, the 
stark reality is that the process of judicial settlement involving the Privy Council is too tardy to offer 
much comfort to the foreign investor. In fact, foreign investors with large sums to invest opt for self-
contained instruments which include disputes settlement provisions tending to favour the ICSID 
route, that is the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes sponsored by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
There are obviously many aspects of the CCJ to be understood. How 
are the people of the Region expected to learn and understand the 
facts surrounding the CCJ, the benefits that can come with its 
establishment, and how to access those benefits? 
 
 The communication component is certainly a very important consideration, and one that has been 
given deserved emphasis. That is why there is already in progress a regional Public Education 
Programme which is designed to foster understanding in relation to the CCJ, the reasons for its 
establishment, the rules which will guide it, and especially, implications relating to its Original 
Jurisdiction and the critical relationship to the CSM&E. This public education effort is being   15
spearheaded at the national level, by national debate and dialogue, in order to adequately represent 
various interests, and address any questions or concerns arising within the national context. 
At the regional level, there have already been very valid concerns raised in relation to the CCJ, 
especially with respect to its structure, funding and the independence of its officers. Opportunity 
must be afforded for the questions to be asked and answered. The people of the Caribbean are, 
therefore, being encouraged to air their views, no matter where they are, through the various media, 
including the Internet, and in different fora, such as town meetings, and to ask the probing questions 
of persons who can answer them. 
The views of the people will naturally be instructive in helping the framers to further settle some 
aspects of the Court's establishment, and to create the structure which is both progressive and 
comfortable for the people of the Region. 
The idea of a Caribbean Court is not new. It has been thirty years in incubation. Now that its time has 
come - this critical investment in our future viability - the real concern must be how do we get it 
right. 
THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
 
What is the relationship between the Caribbean Court of Justice 
(CCJ) and the CARICOM Single Market and Economy? 
 
The CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) is established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas 
as revised by nine Protocols. The Treaty, as revised, is to be interpreted and applied by the CCJ in the 
exercise of its original jurisdiction. 
But how does this function of the CCJ impact on the CARICOM 
Single Market and Economy? 
 
By interpreting and applying the Treaty which establishes the CSME, the CCJ will determine in a 
critical way how the CSME functions. The CSME creates an extensive range of rights and 
obligations for States parties to the Treaty and, through these States parties, for Community 
nationals.   16
Why must Community nationals enjoy rights and discharge 
obligations through their States? Why cannot such nationals enjoy 
rights and discharge obligations without the intervention of their 
States of nationality? 
 
 This is an important question which requires a clear and comprehensive response. Firstly, it must be 
borne in mind that treaties, like the Treaty of Chaguaramas, are governed by international law. 
International law is based on rules which are quite different from the legal rules normally applied by 
judges in our national courts. One  
important difference is that rules of international law ordinarily apply only to States which are called 
subjects of international law. Only in exceptional cases are those rules directly applicable to 
individuals. Consequently, individuals only enjoy rights in international law through their States of 
nationality on which those rights are conferred by international law. For private entities or 
individuals to enjoy rights under an international instrument, the instrument would have to be 




 What are the exceptional circumstances in which rights and 
obligations under international law are conferred on individuals 
directly? 
 
One such exceptional circumstance is the example of the European Union created by the Treaty of 
Rome as amended by the Treaty of Maastricht and which grants rights and creates obligations 
directly for citizens. 
 
How is the Treaty of Chaguaramas different from the Treaty of 
Rome? 
 
 The Treaty of Rome created institutions like the Council of Ministers and the European Commission 
which could make laws directly for European nationals - that is, without the intervention of their 
national assemblies.   17
Why cannot the Organs of the Caribbean Community like the 
Conference of Heads of Government make laws directly for Caribbean 
Community nationals without the intervention of their national 
assemblies? 
 
This is because any such arrangement appears to be politically unacceptable! Consequently, the 
Caribbean Community has always been an association of sovereign States and any decisions of the 
Organs of the Community must be enacted into local law by national assemblies before such 
decisions can create rights and obligations for nationals of the Caribbean Community. And this is an 
extremely important feature of the Caribbean Community! 
Why cannot the Member States of CARICOM agree to have the 
Treaty of Chaguaramas interpreted and applied in some way other 
than the CCJ? The Treaty of Chaguaramas has existed for more than 
twenty-five years without a Court. What is all this fuss now about the 
need for a Caribbean Court to interpret and apply the Treaty? 
 
Yes! Indeed, the old Treaty of Chaguaramas provided for arbitration in the event of disputes 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty. Unfortunately, however, the arbitral 
procedure was never used and serious disputes were never settled, thereby causing the Integration 
Movemeent to be hampered. Moreover, the rights and obligations created by the CSME are so 
important and extensive, relating to the establishment of economic enterprises, the provision of 
professional services, the movement of capital, the acquisition of land for the operation of businesses, 
that there is a clear need to have a permanent, central, regional institution to authoritatively and 
definitively pronounce on those rights and corresponding obligations. The Caribbean Court of Justice 
is intended to be such an authoritative institution. 
Would the absence of such a Court adversely affect the development 
and functioning of the CSME? 
 
Definitely! The Caribbean Community is not known for significant capital accumulation. 
Consequently, it is largely a capital importing Region. Foreign investors seeking to invest normally 
prefer a stable macro-economic environment based on predictable laws in order to determine 
outcomes. Such an environment can and must be created by the CCJ! 
   18
How can the CCJ create a stable macro-economic environment 
suitable for the attraction of foreign capital? 
 
The CCJ has been configured to ensure that the laws of the CSME are uniform and predictable. 
Firstly, the CCJ will have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the interpretation and application of the 
Treaty. If it had concurrent jurisdiction with other Courts of the Community, there is a likelihood of 
conflicting opinions on important economic, commercial and financial issues thereby creating 
uncertainty and unpredictability in the business climate and macro-economic environment! 
So what happens where another Court in the Caribbean Community 
is seised of an issue which involves a question concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty? Must the Court decline 
to accept jurisdiction and pronounce on the case? 
 
No! The Court must accept jurisdiction and refer the particular issue to the CCJ for determination 
before delivering judgment, which must respect the CCJ's determination of the relevant issue! A 
similar requirement of referral obtains in the European Union and it has been credited with 
promoting social and economic cohesion among the Member States. 
What happens if a delinquent party to a dispute refuses to submit to 
the jurisdiction of the CCJ? 
 
By signing on to the Agreement Establishing the CCJ, all Member States of the Community would 
be submitting to the jurisdiction of the CCJ in the exercise of its original jurisdiction which is 
compulsory and exclusive. The European Court of Justice does not enjoy exclusive jurisdiction but 
when a court of last resort is seised of an issue concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaty of Rome, the court must refer the issue to the European Court of Justice for determination. 
 
How are decisions of the CCJ enforced? 
 
Member States signing on to the agreement Establishing the CCJ would agree to enforce its decisions 
in their respective jurisdictions like decisions of their own superior courts. 
What recourse is open to an aggrieved party where the defaulting 
State refuses to enforce a decision of the CCJ? 
 
A. The simple answer is none! But in this respect the regime establishing the CCJ is not different 
from similar regimes establishing the European Court of Justice or the Andean Court of Justice.   19
Participants in the regime would have undertaken to respect and enforce the decisions of the Court 
and one would have to depend on a culture of respect for the rule of law and obedience to the 
determinations of competent tribunals to ensure enforcement of judgments. 
Can the CCJ reverse itself as it considers fit thereby creating 
uncertainty in the applicable norms? 
 
The Agreement Establishing the CCJ does provide for the revision of decisions in specified 
circumstances. But such revisions are intended to satisfy the ordinary requirements of justice! 
Revision of judgments is not to be secured lightly or capriciously. Indeed, in the ordinary course of 




What do you mean by stare decisis? 
 
Stare decisis is peculiar to common law jurisdictions but it has been imported into the Agreement 
Establishing the CCJ to ensure certainty in the applicable norms. The doctrine of stare decisis or 
judicial precedent, requires the Court to pronounce in the same manner provided the circumstances of 
the case are similar. 
You have mentioned the term "norms". What are norms and are they 
peculiar to the original jurisdiction of the CCJ? 
 
"Norms" are rules of law prescribing the conduct to be observed. Norms are not peculiar to the 
original jurisdiction of the CCJ. However, the norms applied by the CCJ in the exercise of its original 
jurisdiction would normally be rules of international law. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, 
the CCJ would apply the norms peculiar to common law jurisdictions as distinct from civil law 
jurisdictions. 
 
Since Suriname and Haiti have civil law jurisdictions, can they 
participate in the regime establishing the CCJ? 
 
A. The response to this question would depend on the jurisdiction of the CCJ to which access is 
desired. Both civil law and common law jurisdictions can participate in the  CCJ in the exercise of its 
original jurisdiction. This is so because the CCJ in exercising its original jurisdiction is discharging 
the functions of an international tribunal applying rules of international law. International law rules   20
are common to both common law and civil law jurisdictions. However, problems would occur if 
Suriname or Haiti wished to participate in the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ where municipal law 
rules and not international law rules apply. Conference has established a Working Group to examine 
the issue with a view to finding an acceptable solution. 
Can private entities, like enterprises or individuals, appear in 
proceedings before the CCJ?  
 
The simple answer is yes, but only by special leave of the Court in special circumstances where the 
Court determines that the interest of justice requires it. However, in the ordinary course of events 
only States would be allowed to espouse a claim in proceedings before the CCJ. Consequently, where 
a private entity is aggrieved, the State of nationality concerned would espouse its cause in 
proceedings before the CCJ. This is one of the peculiarities of international law. For example, the 
parties to the "banana issue" involving private producers were States - the European Union and the 
USA. One may hazard a guess, however, that in the context of the CSME, States would allow their 
nationals to espouse their claims in proceedings before the CCJ wherever the opportunity presents 
itself. 
  
CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE(CCJ) PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE, 
JAMAICA 
 
MOST HON. P.J. PATTERSON, PRIME MINISTER OF JAMAICA 
Mr. Speaker, 
 
The resolution now before us was drafted with meticulous care. 
 
It sets out accurately and in very precise sequence, the commencement in 1970 of the efforts by the 
Caribbean Bar and the GOJ to establish a Caribbean Court as the Final Appellate Body for our region 
and the steps which we have taken since then. 
 
In opening the Debate, I did not think it was necessary to recite the entire history of the Court nor to 
retrace ground which we have already covered. 
 
I deliberately confined myself to two principal issues which have been the subject of interests and 
concerns by those who want to ensure a Court that is immune to political influence and can operate 
in the knowledge that its funding is secure and well assured. 
 
In adopting this approach to my opening, I failed, however, to recognize that with the passage of time 
there are often lapses of memory. 
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Moreover, the composition of Membership in this House is somewhat different from our earlier 
debate.  While  Hansard  is  there  for  the  record,  I  can  no  assume  that  the  new  Members  of  this 
Honourable House, on both sides, are privy to the arguments which have previously been advanced 
in favour of the Court and my earlier refutation of those objections which have been more recently 
advanced. 
 
So Mr. Speaker, in closing the Debate, I owe it to this House and to history to reiterate much of what 





The Government did not have to bring this Resolution to Parliament.  Nothing in constitutional law 
or practice required us to do so. 
 
Having  signed  the  Agreement  with  our  CARICOM  partners,  two  years  ago,  we  could  quite 
legitimately have moved to ratification without further discussion or reference to the Legislature. 
 
From the outset, it was my view that Parliament, representing the collective voice and authority of 
the People of Jamaica, should be fully involved.  I wanted nothing to be done in Nicodemus fashion. 
 
There  is  no  precedent  in  this  Parliament  since  1944  or  elsewhere  in  the  Caribbean  for  this  two-
pronged Debate which we are completing today. 
 
Let  us  therefore  put  an  end  once  and for all to any suggestion that we are being arrogant in the 





It was my hope that members of this House and of the Senate would seize the opportunity to have an 
informed and reasoned debate which would enhance the value, effectiveness and reputation of the 
Court to be established. 
 
A number of speakers on both sides of this and the Senate have in fact made this kind of contribution 
and I thank them for it. 
 
They may rest assured that, in settling the final content of the common legislation that will establish 
the Court, all reasonable suggestions and genuine concerns will be taken into account. 
 
The passage of this Resolution will not bring the CCJ into being ￿ just one important step closer.  
The legislation will still have to come before us.  So will the repeal of Section 110 and whatever will 
replace it, be brought to Parliament. 
 
It was not by accident that my opening was carefully modulated to avoid any semblance of partisan 
rhetoric or to score political points. 
 
Unfortunately, the Leader of the Opposition could not resist the temptation to flash outside the off-
stump.  As long as he keeps on convincing himself that nothing which is good has happened during 
the  last  fourteen  years  that  the  PNP  has  formed  the  elected  government  of  this  country  and  is   22
convinced that his assessment of a perfect Government when he was in charge is shared by the 
majority of the electorate, so long will he remain where he is and we will stay where we are. 
 
According to him, this whole exercise is a plot by the PNP to deny justice to the people of Jamaica. 
 
While I could, if necessary, reply in kind, I will resist the temptation to reduce this debate to the level 
of street corner brawl.  When he was championing the CCJ, was it not to give the people of Jamaica 
greater access to justice for all? 
 
I cannot, however, ignore the fact that he has sought to give the impression that the judges of the CCJ 
are going to be subjected to irresistible pressure by the political directorates, not only by Jamaica, but 
by all the CARICOM countries that are members of the court.  He states: 
 
￿Retention of the Privy Council, which is beyond political manipulation, is essential to our 
future support￿. 
 
Why should there be greater confidence in Judges of the Privy Council chosen by a system in the UK 
over which the Lord Chancellor presides?  Does he not believe that we can devise a system to ensure 
judicial probity in a Parliamentary Democracy?   
 
We must have more confidence in ourselves.   
 
If after 40 years, we need judicial surveillance from London, we are unworthy of the heritage which 
our National Heroes and great ancestors have entrusted to us. 
 
We, of course, reject the notion that the Magistrates and Judges of Jamaica are incapable of resisting 
coercion and corruption unless our judicial system is kept under the control of the Privy Council.  We 
prefer  to  believe,  in  common  with  the  majority  of  Jamaicans,  that  the  integrity  of  a  judge  is 
determined primarily by his own character and his professional training. 
 
The  author  of  an  article  in  the  Caribbean  Review,  Hugh  Rawlins,  puts  the  matter  this  way: 
￿ultimately  institutional  framework  cannot  alone  guarantee  judicial  independence.    True 
independence of mind and spirit cannot be dictated.   It comes from within.  It is written in the heart 
and springs only from strength of character exemplified by a burning desire to be impartial and to do 
justice to all and under all circumstances.￿   
 
With all due respect to the Leader of the Opposition and those who may think like him, I do not 
believe that these qualities of character and integrity are the monopoly of a single nation or ethnic 
group. 
 
I am pleased that a number of Speakers, from the Opposition side, clearly disassociated themselves 
from any such view. 
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THE CHANGING STANCE OF THE JAMAICA LABOUR PARTY 
 
This recent stance by the Leader of the Opposition comes against the background of thirty years of 
support  from  his  Party  for  the  abolition  of  appeals  to the Privy Council and the substitution of a 
Regional Appellate Court. 
 
It also comes against the background of their support for the Caribbean Single Market Economy and 
the establishment of a regional institution with juridical status to determine questions arising under 
the Treaty of Chaguramas and the day-to-day operations of the CSME. 
 
Strangely enough, they do not object to a regional court with Caribbean Judges deciding on disputes 
between Member States.  
 
If  our  judiciary is so susceptible to political influence as the Leader of the Opposition appears to 
believe,  is  this  not  more  likely  to  happen  when  the  issue  involves  a  dispute  between  the  States 
themselves? 
 
From where does this notion come, that the more remote the Court is from the people, the sounder its 
judgments are likely to be?  If that is true, why are English Courts not subject to the same dangers for 
cases between British citizens and Corporations? 
 
And what of cases, originating in the Caribbean, to which a citizen or company of the UK is a Party?  
I firmly believe that the Courts of the UK can render a ruling in accordance with the law, but I also th     
to be the situation with Judges of integrity and learning, who can be found in the Caribbean. 
 
If  Caribbean  judges are incapable of exercising independent judgment in disputes between citizen 
and  citizen,  or  between  a  citizen  and  one  state,  unless  they  are  under  the  tutelage  of our former 
colonial  masters,  why  do  they  accept  that  they  will  have  this  independent  capability  in  disputes 
between one state and another? 
 
I  repudiate  any  argument  based  on  contempt  for  the  capability  of  Caribbean  jurists  to  justify  the 




The Opposition Leader has also discovered some strange reasons for rebutting the grounds advanced 
by those who support the idea. 
 







a.  Sovereignty  
b.  Development of an indigenous jurisprudence 
c.  Making justice more affordable by the people. 
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He  claims  that  the  contention  that  the  CCJ  is  necessary  to  complete  the  attainment  of  full 
sovereignty is ￿faulty reasoning riddled with self-serving purposes￿.  Is he not aware that the pooling 
of sovereignty is in itself an exercise of sovereignty? e.g. joining the UN or NATO. 
 
It is an act of sovereignty that empowers us to devise and establish this Regional Court.  The UK 
subscribes to the EU Court, as a sovereign power.  This is what explains the ￿volte face￿ on Capital 
Punishment. 
 
With  respect  to  the  development  of  an  indigenous  jurisprudence  to  ￿reflect  the  moral  social  and 
economic imperatives of its people￿, he says that this is ￿the most dangerous reason advanced to 
support the CCJ￿.  It opens the door, he says, to a devious political directorate to fashion the law to 
its own suit.   
 
Is  he  not  suggesting  here  that  Caribbean  Judges  will  be  either  coerced  or  corrupted  to  the 
￿machiavellian￿  schemes  which  the political directorates of the region are even now fashioning in 
some secret conspiracy? 
 
Since that was not his conviction in 1988, where is the evidence for this newfound fear now and who 
are the participants in this wicked conspiracy? 
 
With respect to the greatly increased accessibility of the CCJ by reason of the reduced cost to the 
litigants, he dismisses this as of no real importance.  It will, he asserts, only benefit ￿some litigants￿ 
but will be more expensive to the states.  Furthermore, it will only provide ￿cheap justice riddled 
with injustice￿. 
 
Mr.  Speaker,  the  new  members  of  this  Honourable  House,  on  both  sides,  who  listened  to  this 
powerful  and  contemptuous  dismissal  of  the  reasons  justifying  the  CCJ  will,  I  am  sure,  be 
exceedingly surprised to learn that these were, in fact, the very same compelling reasons advanced 
and wholly accepted by the Jamaican Cabinet presided over by the then Prime Minister, in May of 
1988.  
 
The  recommendations  for  the  establishment  of  the  CCJ  as  conveyed  to  Cabinet  were  specifically 
stated to be on the basis of six reasons which were as follows: 
 
1.  That the Privy Council involves considerable expense in the pursuit of the right of the 
citizens having regard to the location of the court in the United Kingdom; 
 
2.  That appeals to the Privy Council have been abolished by most jurisdictions outside 
the Caribbean; 
 
3.  That  it  is  an  inhibiting  factor  in  the  development  of  an  indigenous  jurisprudence 
which  is  more  responsive  to  the  values  within  our  society  and  our  aims  and 
aspirations as an independent nation; 
 
4.  That it militates against the development of the potential of our local judges; 
 
5.  That it is regarded as a burdensome appendage by the English judicial system and by 
some as even anachronistic; 
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6.  That  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  full  attainment  of  political  sovereignty  and 
independence. 
 
It will be seen, from the foregoing, that the reasons now so strongly dismissed by the Leader of the 
Opposition were the very ones that convinced his Cabinet in May of 1988 that the CCJ was the way 
to go.   
 
This  was  the decision on which he acted on in July 1988 when he joined with other CARICOM 
Heads of Government in accepting the decision to abolish appeals to the Privy Council and substitute 
the CCJ. 
 
Since 1988, the Leader of the Opposition has therefore repudiated not only the decision to which he 
was a party, but the very reasoning on which it was based.   
 
What more need I say? 
 
We will not allow him to forget the contents of his own party manifesto in respect of this matter. 
 
Let me be charitable and assert that he suffered an uncharacteristic lapse of memory in replacing the 
Privy  Council  with  the  CCJ  ￿  which  was  certainly  one  of  the  issues  in  the  last  general  election 
campaign. 
 
He says that these changes in his views on the CCJ are due to changing circumstances.  The only 
change I can detect is his movement form this side as Prime Minister to that side as Leader of the 
Opposition. 
 
CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
Let me turn now to some constitutional issues that have been raised by other speakers. 
WHY WAS SECTION 110 NOT ENTRENCHED 
The decision not to entrench the right of appeal to the Privy Council in the Jamaican Constitution 
was  a  considered  and  deliberate  act  of  the  Joint  Select  Committee  of  Parliament  that  drafted  the 
Constitution immediately prior to Independence. 
 
For most of its sittings, this Committee was chaired by Norman Manley. It was guided and advised 
by Sir Leslie Cundall, the then Attorney General, who later became President of the Court of Appeal. 
The  Committee  contained  other  experienced  and  distinguished  lawyers,  notably,  Sir  Neville 
Ashenheim, Douglas Fletcher, Donald Sangster and Clem Tavares. 
 
The  Committee  decided  unanimously  to  retain  appeals  to  the  Privy  Council  because  the  Federal 
Court of Appeal would no longer have jurisdiction in Jamaica and a new and hitherto untried local 
Court  of  Appeal  would  have  to  be  established.  It  was  recognised,  however,  that  many 
Commonwealth  countries,  on  becoming  independent,  had  either  after  some  lapse  of  time  or 
immediately (as in the case of India), abolished appeals to the Privy Council. 
 
It  was  therefore  decided  to  leave  it  to  the  unfettered  decision  of  the  Parliament  of  Independent 
Jamaica to decide whether to make our local Court of Appeal the final court or to retain the right of   26
appeal to the Privy Council until such time as other arrangements are made, including a court to 
continue in the fine traditions of the Federal Court of Appeal. 
 
Furthermore, commonsense dictated that it would not be sensible to enshrine in the constitution an 
institution whose continued willingness to hear appeals from Jamaica could not be enforced by us. 
The Privy Council is an institution of the United Kingdom government. It was thought unwise to 
entrench an institution that could be abolished without any input from ourselves. 
 
ABOLITION OF APPEALS BY SPECIAL LEAVE OF HER MAJESTY 
The government intends, Mr. Speaker, to put forward legislation not only to abolish appeals to Her 
Majesty  in  Council  where  those  appeals    are  as  of  right  or  by  leave  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  as 
provided in sub-sections 1 and 2 of section 110 of the Constitution, but also expressly, to abolish 
such appeals where they are appeals by special leave of Her Majesty. 
 
There is express reference, in sub-section 3 of section 110, to the right of Her Majesty to grant such 
special  leave  to  appeal.  This  is  what  is  referred  to  in  practice  as  a  prerogative  right,  that  is,  the 
residual royal prerogative right of the sovereign.  
 
 
Now, there have been arguments raised in some quarters and in this Honourable House, that as long 
as the Queen remains the Head of the Jamaican state, the prerogative right to grant special leave to 
appeal cannot be abolished by legislation enacted by the Jamaican Parliament. 
 
As long ago as 1935, before most of the members of this Honourable House were even born, that 
very point fell to be determined by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, itself in a case from 
Canada. They held that such an argument is invalid.  
 
What happened in that case was that a petition for special leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council 
against a conviction by a Canadian Court was brought, despite the fact that the Canadian legislation 
had  enacted  legislation  abolishing  all  rights  of  appeal  to  His  Majesty  in  Council.    A  question 
therefore arose as to the validity of the legislation in so far as it abolished appeals by special leave to 
His Majesty. 
 
In that case, the Privy Council described the nature of appeals to His Majesty in Council. Basically, 
this is what it said, although I here refer to Her Majesty:  
 
The  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  is  a  statutory  body  and, in accordance with statute, 
appeals to Her Majesty in Council are referred by Her Majesty to, and are heard by, the Judicial 
Committee.  
 
The Judicial Committee then makes a report or recommendation to Her Majesty in Council for Her 
decision, the nature of such report or recommendation being always stated in open court. Although 
all the Committee does is to make a report or recommendation to Her Majesty in Council, by whom 
an Order in Council is made to give effect to the report or recommendation of the Committee, the 
Committee is clearly a judicial body or court. 
 
So, an appeal to Her Majesty in Council is such an appeal in form only, and has, in truth, become an 
appeal to the Judicial Committee which, as such, in reality exercises, as a court of law, the residual   27
prerogative of Her Majesty in Council. The position is no different where the appeal is by special 
leave to Her Majesty. 
 
Against this background, Mr. Speaker, the Privy Council held that, by virtue of provisions in an 
Imperial statute conferring on the Canadian legislature certain legislative powers - now mirrored in 
those conferred on the Jamaican legislature by the Jamaica Independence Act - earlier limitations on 
the  legislative  powers  of  the  Canadian  Parliament  had  been  abrogated    and,  hence,  that  the 
provisions of the Canadian Act abolishing appeals to Her Majesty in Council were valid. The Privy 




As  established  by  the  Privy  Council  itself,  it  is  therefore  well within the powers of the Jamaican 
Parliament to enact legislation abolishing all appeals to the Privy Council, including all such appeals 
as are brought by special leave of Her Majesty, provided of course that this is done expressly or 
where this is the necessary intendment of the legislature. 
 
TRANSACTION OF BUSINESS BY THE REGIONAL JUDICIAL AND LEGAL SERVICES 
COMMISSION 
There  have  been  certain  complaints,  coming  from  the  Bar  Association,  in  particular,  concerning 
Article  V.7  (a)  of  the  Agreement  Establishing  the  Caribbean  Court  of  Justice  which  provides  as 
follows: 
  Subject to paragraph 13 of this Article, the Commission shall not be: 
(a)  disqualified  from  the  transaction  of  business  by  reason  of  any  vacancy  in  its 
membership  and  its  proceedings  shall  not  be  invalidated  by  the  presence  or 
participation  of  any  person  not  entitled  to  be  present  or  to  participate  in  those 
proceedings. 
(b)  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
 
Paragraph 13, to which paragraph 7 is subject, makes provision for what is to constitute a quorum for 
the  transaction  of  business  by  the  Commission,  namely,  not  less  than  six  members  of  the 
Commission  including  the  Chairman  or,  where  the  Deputy  Chairman  is  presiding,  the  Deputy 
Chairman. 
 
The provision in Article V.7 (a) is neither new or uncommon. It is commonly found in constitutional 
provisions relating to constitutional Commissions including the Judicial Service Commission. 
 
The provision in section 135(2) of the Constitution of Jamaica which relates to all the Commissions 
established by the Constitution ￿ and this would include the Judicial Service Commission, the Public 
Service Commission and the Police Service Commission ￿ is in very similar, almost identical, terms 
and to the same effect as the provision in article V.7 (a). 
 
Section 135(2) of the Constitution provides as follows: 
At any meeting of the Commission established by this Constitution a quorum shall be 
constituted if three members are present. If a quorum is present the Commission shall 
not be disqualified for the transaction of business by reason of any vacancy among its 
members and any proceedings of the Commission shall be valid notwithstanding that 
some person who was not entitled so to do took part therein. 
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Other  Constitutions  contain  similar  provisions.  The  Constitution  of  Barbados,  for  example, 
contains in section 92.3, a virtually identical provision. So too does the Constitution of Guyana in 
section 226(1), 
 
As Dr Lloyd Barnett says in The Constitutional Law of Jamaica at page 120 when commenting on 
section 135 of the Constitution of Jamaica: 
     
The Constitution provides that at a meeting of the Commission a quorum shall consist 
of three members and if this requirement is satisfied it remains qualified to exercise 
its powers despite vacancies in its membership￿The proceedings of the Commission 
are valid despite the participation of unqualified persons but it does not appear that 
the presence of such a person can be taken into account in determining the quorum or 
in counting the votes. 
 
It is to be noted that in his book Dr. Barnett makes no adverse comments on this provision as it 
appears in the Jamaican Constitution. 
 
FINANCIAL SECURITY OF THE JUDGES 
In  dealing  with  the  financial  security  of  the  court,  let  us  first  examine  the  protection which our 
Constitution provides for the remuneration payable to Judges of our own Supreme Court and Court 
of Appeal.   
 
According to Sections 101 and 107 of the Constitution of Jamaica, the salaries payable to judges of 
those courts under the Constitution shall be charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund. 
 
Provision is also made under those Sections that the emoluments and terms and conditions of service 
of such a Judge, other than allowances that are not taken into account in computing pensions, shall 
not be altered to his disadvantage during his continuance in office. 
 
In addition, the salaries of those Judges are set out in the Judiciary Act and the minister of Finance 
may,  by  Order  subject  to  negative  Resolution  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  increase  those 
salaries. 
 
The  salaries  and  allowances  of  the  Judges  of  the  Caribbean  Court  of  Justice  are  secured  in  like 
manner by the provision in Article XXXVIII of the Agreement which provides that the salaries and 
allowances  payable  to  the  President  and  other  Judges,  as  well  as  other  terms  and  conditions  of 
service, shall not be altered to their disadvantage during their tenure of office. 
 
 
FINANCING THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE  
 
In  time,  all  matters  relating  to  the  financing  of  the Court, including the Loan Agreement and the 
Trust Fund will be laid in the Houses of parliament.  Initially, it was decided that the expenses of the 
Court  would  have  required  an  annual  contribution  by  Jamaica  and  other  Member  States  in 
accordance with the CARICOM assessed scale of contributions. 
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The Legal Affairs Committee of CARICOM reviewed various options regarding the financing of 
the  Court  since  the  history  of  payments  by  Member  States  of  their  contributions  to  CARICOM 
institutions did not instill confidence in the mechanism outlined above. 
 
At first, there was a recommendation for the creation of a Revolving Fund of approximately US$21 
million which would cover the first five years of operations with subsequent annual contributions to 
the  Fund  to  ensure  that  the  fund  maintained  a  balance  equivalent  to  the  operating  costs  of  the 
succeeding five years. 
 
The  Conference  of  Heads  of  Government  ultimately  agreed  with  a  recommendation  of  the 
Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice that there should be 
established  a  Trust  Fund  with  a  one  time  settlement  of  US  $88  million  based  on  the  ten  year 
projected cash flows of operating the Court, along with approximately US$12 million for the capital 
and operating cost for the first two years of the Court￿s operation. 
 
The Heads of Government approached the Caribbean Development Bank to raise the amount to be 
placed in the Trust Fund on the international capital market and administered by that Bank or some 
other body, away from Government control or interference. 
 
The interest received from the Trust Fund would cover the total annual operating costs of the Court 
ad infinitum.   This figure takes into account the salaries and allowances of the Judges, registry and 
administrative  staff,  security,  gratuities  for  Judges  and  administrative  staff,  other  administrative 
costs, Fund management fees and capital expenditure. 
 
Jamaica￿s  contribution  to  the  Trust  Fund  would  be  secured  by  a  loan  from  the  Caribbean 
Development  Bank  in  the  amount  of  approximately  US$27  million  to  be  repaid  in  40  quarterly 
instalments at an interest rate of 5.5 per cent per annum on the amount of the principal. 
 
The amounts referred to above were arrived at after extensive consultations between representatives 
of CARICOM Ministers of Finance and representative of the Caribbean Development Bank.  The 
Bank￿s staff is of the view that if the Trust Fund is to be sustainable in perpetuity, it will need to opt 
for an investment strategy that incorporates securities whose overall rate of return exceeds annual 
inflation in the market where the Court is located. 
 
Toward  this  end,  the  Trust  Fund  will  need  to  engage  investment  advisors  who  would  design  a 
suitable investment strategy and manage the relationship with professional asset managers on behalf 
of the Board of Trustees. 
 
The Board of Trustees will be responsible for the overall administration of the Trust Fund including 
the  appointment  of  the  Executive  Officer,  the  External  Auditor  and  the  approval  of  investment 
guidelines.  The operation of the Trust Fund will be independent of the CARICOM governments and 
its annual income will be devoted to meeting the operating budget and financial requirements of the 
Court from year three of its operations in perpetuity. 
 
 
We  recognise  that  it  is  critical  that  the  Caribbean  Court  of  Justice  be  financed  in  a  manner  that 
promotes its financial independence and sustainability.  The preservation of the independence of the 
Court is of paramount importance for promoting the credibility of the court and to maintaining the 
long and zealously guarded tradition within CARICOM of an independent judiciary. 
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It is also recognised that assured funding for the Court and, in particular, its financial insulation 
from  annual  budgetary  subventions  from  CARICOM  Member  States,  is  vitally  important  for  its 
transparent independence from political interference. 
 
The  criteria  for  choosing  a  financing  option  to  capitalize  the  Trust  Fund,  therefore,  included 
considerations  of  cost  effectiveness,  efficiency,  financial  reliability  and  robustness  of  the  funding 
source  and  above  all,  minimizing  the  possibility  of  compromising  the  independence  and 







The Leader of the Opposition has sought to condemn me for an assertion that I have repeatedly made 
that  I  will  not  ￿allow  any  group  anywhere  under  the  guise  of  judicial  hearings  to  make  policy 
decisions which fall in our own sovereign competence￿. 
 
This statement I will neither withdraw nor modify and indeed I would expect this entire House to 
defend. 
 
It is the prerogative of Parliament to enact the laws which govern our nation. 
 
It  is  the  duty  of  the Courts to interpret the Law and apply it to the cases which fall within their 
jurisdiction. 
 
Mr. Speaker, how can we countenance judicial legislation? 
 
This is not about the flexing of political muscle.  In our system of law, as distinct from a Government 
of men, there could be no other way. 
 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the rulings in a line of cases, beginning with Pratt and 
Morgan, in the early part of the last decade have amounted to judicial legislation. 
 
Mr. Speaker,  
 
The  Leader  of  the  Opposition  contends  that  it  is  because  of  inefficiencies  in  our  system  why 
sentences of capital punishment handed down by the Court in Jamaica have not been fulfilled. 
 
He says that the Privy Council has upheld convictions on hangings. 
 
Let him tell this House, which was the last case before the Privy Council coming from any country in 
any part of the world, where the Privy Council has upheld a capital punishment decision. 
 
When last? 
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Over these last few years, there has been the complaint coming not only from me, but from highly 
knowledgeable  and  experienced  jurists,  that  certainly  in  constitutional  issues  concerning  the  death 
penalty, the Privy Council has been engaged in judicial legislation. 
 
Many of those who previously espoused the compelling case for the creation of the Caribbean Court 
and who are violently opposed to capital punishment, have changed gear and reversed their position.   
 
They are convinced that so long as the Privy Council exists, it will persist in rulings against capital 
punishment which have the result of effectively abolishing the death penalty.  
 
To mask their true intent, which is to make sure that throughout the Caribbean, capital punishment 
will remain in desuetude, they now proceed disingenuously to argue that the CCJ is being established 
purely because of the wish of Caribbean Governments to carry the death penalty. Nothing could be 






No one can foretell the kinds of ruling that will emanate from the Caribbean Court of Justice on these 
issues.  Already, the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal has ruled that the mandatory nature of the 
death penalty provided for by some Caribbean territories is unconstitutional. 
 
Barbados and Belize have moved to amend their constitutions to reverse the rulings of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council by the legislative authority of Parliament. 
 
[Refer to my letter of 4
th December 2002 to Most Hon. Edward Seaga] 
 
Its rulings in the appeals brought by Neville Lewis, et. al., the Privy Council overturned decisions to 
the contrary which had only recently been made.  One of the judges, Lord Hoffman, disagreed with 
the other and was very critical not only of the decision, but the motives behind the rulings.  He said 
 
￿All  these  questions  have  been  considered  and  answered  in  recent  decisions  of  the 
Board ￿  The Board now proposes to depart from its recent decisions.  I do not think 
there  is  any  justification  for  doing  so  ￿    The  power  of  final  interpretation  of  a 
constitution  must  be  handled  with  care.    If  the  Board  feels  able  to  depart  from  a 
previous decision because its members on a given occasion have a ￿doctrinal disposition 
to come out differently￿, the rule of law itself will be damaged and there will be no 
stability in the administration of justice in the Caribbean￿. 
 
One of our eminent jurists, Mr. Justice James Kerr, has also commented on these issues.  He states 
that the mandates laid down by the Privy Council in the Lewis Case as to how the Jamaican Privy 
Council  should  proceed  in  the  exercise  of  the  Prerogative  of  Mercy,  are ￿essentially a matter for 
legislation￿. 
 
THIS ISSUE OF AN INDICATIVE REFERENDUM 
 
The Leader of the Opposition and his members have wrongly asserted that the question of the CCJ 
was not an issue in the last General Elections.   32
 
Long before the general election was announced, I had publicly stated that part of the mandate that 
we would seek from the people, would include the establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice. 
The People's National Party views this as part of the process of Constitutional Reform and that is 




The concept of sovereignty in Jamaica, is a common factor which links four projects and manifesto 
issues included in the PNP's vision of our development as we embark on the second forty years of 
Jamaica's existence as an independent nation.  
These relate to: 
 A Charter of Fundamental Rights entrenched in the Constitution. 
 The movement away from a monarchical to a republican system of government. 
 The abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and their replacement 
by appeals from the Court of Appeal to a Caribbean Court of Justice which would constitute 
Jamaica's final appellate tribunal. 
 Jamaica's place and leadership role in the process of Caribbean regional integration. 
 
The People's National Party (government) will, in the next term, complete the decolonisation journey 
with the repatriation of our justice process'' 
 
And at page 66, that the PNP led government will: 
 
￿subscribe to the Caribbean Court of Justice as the country￿s final Court of Appeal in its 
appellate  jurisdiction  and  as  the  arbiter  of  trade  disputes  arising  from  the  CSME 
jurisdiction￿. 
 
On the other hand, the JLP Manifesto for the same general election held in October last year states, at 
page 176 that: 
 
￿The threat by the government to withdraw from use of the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council as the final Court of Appeal for Jamaica poses serious concerns for the 
quality of final judicial review￿.     
 
Therefore, not surprisingly, at page 180, it concluded that a JLP government will: 
 
￿continue to utilize the services of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as the final 
Court of Appeal￿.   
 
How could such clear differences of policy and intention now conveniently be forgotten? 
 
The intention of the PNP was made clear and manifest.   
 
Why does the JLP choose to pretend otherwise? 
 
In our system of parliamentary democracy, there was a clear cut choice.         The people have 
spoken. 
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The vast majority of the former British colonies which became independent sovereign states have 
abolished appeals to the Privy Council.  None of them considered it either necessary or desirable to 
hold a referendum on the subject.  Where is the precedent and what is the compelling reason for an 
indicative referendum? 
 
Remember the Opposition had stated unequivocally their intention to pull out of the Court if they had 
succeeded at the polls.   We on the Government side clearly expressed our determination to have the 
Caribbean Court as our final appellate tribunal. 
 
This is why, I signed but refrained from proceeding to ratify the Agreement before 16
th October. 
 
In any event, a Referendum at this stage would, in practice, be impossible to hold unless a special 
law was passed authorising the use of the existing electoral machinery for that purpose. 
 




When did we have a Referendum as to whether the Privy Council should be our Final Court? 
 
Even if such a law were to be passed, it could not, of itself, confer any binding effect on the result of 
the Referendum. 
 
In light of the Section 48 of the Constitution, only a constitutional amendment could have that effect.  
Furthermore, the structure and modalities of the court are still in the process of negotiation.  They 
have not yet been made binding on the Member States. 
 
For  Jamaica  to  take  further  part  in  these  final  negotiations,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  ratify  the 
agreement  as  we  are  now  seeking  to  do  and  so  become  effectively  involved  in  the  eventual 
establishment of the Court. 
 
Who  is  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  electorate  gave  a  favourable  verdict  in  the  last  General 
Election?  Is it some private body, however, small but respected, or is it the will of the people as 
reflected in the election results? 
 
How do we decide which of the present provisions in our Constitution that can be changed by the 
requisite Parliamentary majority should now be subject to a Referendum?  Is there any section apart 
from 110 that deserves a variation from what the Order in Council required and if so which?   
 




The government has always been in favour of entrenching the Court in our Constitution, once it has 
been established and becomes fully functional. 
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It is necessary to reiterate that even when the Court commences to sit, there are cases which will 
still be pending before the Privy Council and those litigants will not be denied access to the Privy 
Council. 
 
It  is  important  to  understand  what  the  process  of  entrenchment  means  and  how  it  can  be 
accomplished.  Entrenchment  means  that  the  section  of  the  Constitution  establishing  a  particular 
institution, in this case Section 110, must be listed in Section 49 as requiring a special process for 
repeal or alteration. To accomplish this, however, requires an amendment to section 49. 
 
In practice, such an amendment cannot take place unless the Opposition in both the House and the 
Senate are prepared to co-operate. Further, if it is desired to deeply entrench the provision than after 
the law is passed by both Houses in the appropriate manner, it has to be put to the voters for approval 
or rejection. Only if it is approved can it be signed by the Governor General and become the law of 
the land. That is the Referendum which the Constitution permits and which has lasting legal effect. 
 
We are intent on the establishment of the court with both its original and final adjudication. Only 
then, can we take the required steps to enable its entrenchment. 
 
This government will bring to Parliament, at the appropriate time, proposals to amend section 49 so 
as to entrench the Caribbean Court of Justice in our Constitution.  
 
The first step in the entrenchment process is that the Bill in question must be approved by at least a 








The main concerns expressed by the Opposition and other groups have been fully addressed. 
 
The  enabling  Acts  of  legislation  will  have  to  be  brought  to  Parliament  and  passed  with  the 
appropriate majorities. 
 
The entrenchment of the Court should be seen as part of the parcel of constitutional amendments 
which will have to be brought before Parliament as we seek to complete our process of sovereignty. 
 




I have in this reply sought to respond fully in order to allay any genuine fear or concern. 
 
I am confident my arguments will command the confidence of this Honourable House.  They should 
also serve to explain why we cannot support the amendment on the Order Paper from the Leader of 
the Opposition. 
 
Mr. Speaker,   35
 
After Parliament has given its approval to ratify the treaty, there is still time and room to discuss how 
and when we make the full transition from the Privy Council as the Court of last resort to the CCJ as 
our final Court of Appeal. 
 
I am prepared as Prime Minister, (and so is the Government) to explore any avenue that would result 
in a possible agreement as to exactly how we proceed to repeal the non-entrenched provisions of 
Section  110  and  what  we  put  in  its  place.    This  will  have  to  take  into  account  the  fundamental 
decision reached in Antigua that as to the best option of 4. 
 
----- Refer here to Hansard Report 
 
I am also cognizant that in new provisions to replace the present Section 110, it might 
be necessary and also feasible, to make special transitional arrangements for certain 
questions of constitutional interpretation and rulings that affect existing fundamental 
rights and freedoms. 
 
I have always been prepared to engage in dialogue.  Let us build on our tradition as a 
Parliamentary Democracy to foster continuing dialogue for the good of our nation and 









LET THE PEOPLE SPEAK! 
 
Introduction 
The history of the proposed Caribbean Court of Justice, has been documented.  It was first 
mooted in 1970.   Work proceeded by way of further discussions from time to time at official 
levels  until  the  proposal  re-surfaced  at  the  Caricom  Heads  of  Government  meeting  in 
Antigua in 1988. 
 
The discussion at that time and at that level, was against the background of a relative sense 
of security in the region.  There were no special economic threats; social stability prevailed; 
the criminal justice system was not under siege. 
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This scenario warranted a serious look at the proposal for an indigenous court which 
would be an appellate court of final jurisdiction for the region, including Jamaica. 
 
As  Prime  Minister  at  that  time,  this  was  the  perspective  in  which  the  Government  of 
Jamaica saw the proposed regional court.  We did not view it with disfavour, provided a 
mechanism could be devised to ensure that Judges would be so appointed as to be entirely 
free of political connections to ensure that their independence would not be in question. 
 
I  expressed  this  view  as  Prime  Minister  at  that  time  and,  had  conditions  not  changed 
drastically, I would perhaps have held the same view today. 
 
However, times have changed, indeed, drastically so. 
 
The  economic  climate  of  15  years  ago,  no  longer  prevails.    There  was  certainty  and 
predictability, robust economic growth, relatively stable social conditions in which crime was 
not of epidemic proportions and the justice system worked.  Today, each of these conditions 
have now been reversed.  The economy is out of control; the society has been destabilized 
by fear and the criminal justice system has broken down. 
 
These conditions have cast an entirely different perspective over our future.  The justice 
system, which was not of great concern, is now of prime importance to Jamaicans who see 
their future threatened by an unjust system.   
 
The proposal for the establishment of a Caribbean Court of Justice is now being viewed as 
an uncertainty which cannot be risked amidst all the other fearful uncertainties of the times.   
 
If the proposal under consideration was for the establishment of any other institution but a 
court of justice, it would not be as compelling to follow a path which offers certainty.  But 
times  have  changed  drastically  over  the  past  decade  or  more  and  circumstances  now 
compel us to retain the security of what we know to be a tried and tested system of justice 
in the Privy Council, rather than to venture with a new institution, the proposed Caribbean 
Court of Justice.  This is not a time for adventure. 
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If it is the intention of Government to contend that our original position of cautious and 
conditional agreement for and further evaluation should mean full approval at this time, 15 
years later,  let me remind them that it is the business of a thinking party to think and re-
think its position, according to changing conditions.  I need only remind them of the process 
of evolution of the Federation of the West Indies, a concept which was endorsed in the 
beginning by both parties, enthusiastically by one, cautiously by the other.  But with the 
evolution of other ideas and changing conditions over time, the original position was re-
thought and rejected by the JLP.  I need further remind them that had we not re-thought our 
original position on the federation, we would all be sitting here today as a Parliament without 
real sovereignty, an appendendage of some other Parliament elsewhere. 
 
Evaluation 
The Resolution before Parliament is to seek ratification of the Agreement to establish the 
Caribbean Court of Justice as our final court of appeal for Jamaica, replacing the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. 
 
The arguments offered propose that the Caribbean Court of Justice is necessary in order to: 
-  Fulfill our political sovereignty by providing for an indigenous institution; 
-  Allow  for  a  system  of  jurisprudence  which  takes  into  account  ￿the 
circumstances of our society and the aspirations of our people￿; 
-  Make justice more affordable to the people. 
 
This is a partial list which is silent on whether the court would be: 
-  An improvement  of the present judicial system in Jamaica; 
-  Independent of political interference; 
-  A permanent part of our judicial system. 
 
These six queries define the position of the CCJ and its claim to establishment.  Let us 
review the arguments, one by one; 
 
Sovereignty 
To say that we must have an indigenous court to fulfill our sovereignty is faulty reasoning 
riddled with self-serving purposes.   38
 
Our  sovereignty  can  only  be  defined  in terms of a Jamaican position which we already 
enjoy.  Any re-definition in regional terms has nothing to do with sovereignty as there is no 
existing regional Government which has been endowed with sovereign powers. 
 
What is apparently meant is that the CCJ is to serve the purpose of achieving a greater 
Caribbean identity to satisfy a Caribbean citizenry which does not at this time exist, but is 
expected to emerge when all the pieces of the plan for Caribbean Integration are in place.  
This is a critical factor in understanding the real purpose and intent of the Government, as I 
will set out later. 
 
What credibility exists to support an argument of attaining sovereignty by establishment of 
an indigenous court by a Government which has divested into the hands of foreigners much 
of  the  indigenous  Jamaican  financial  system,  telecommunication  network,  central 
production  base,  a  national  airport  with  another  to  come,  vital  public  utilities  and  other 
critical underpinnings of national ownership and control?  
Simply to wave the flag of sovereignty will not necessarily arouse us emotionally as it does 
at a football game or in some other event where we are proud of the performance of a 
Jamaican team.  The flag of the CCJ goes to the heart of how our country is judged and 
who are the judges.  To that extent, the flag is a flag of convenience and not a flag which is 
to be used as the prime argument and reason for creating a system of justice to satisfy the 
spurious question of sovereignty. 
 
The concept of sovereignty is far different today than it was when the Jamaican Constitution 
was first drafted in 1962.  There are new considerations of cross-border traffic in money and 
in trade; of systems of governance which are being tailored to a free market and market 
principles  which  have  taken  over  the  globe.    These  must  be  reviewed  on  the  basis  of 
whether they are only compatible with certain systems of governance. 
 
In respect of sovereignty as a concept, Dr. Lloyd Barnett, the most eminent constitutional 
authority in the country has this to say: 
  ￿Political sovereignty is at first blush emotionally compelling.  However, in a 
world  which  is  increasingly  becoming  a  global  village  and  in  which 
jurisdiction over important areas of national life is more and more conferred   39
on regional and international bodies, this argument is losing much of its 
force. 
 
  In any event, the proposed court would not be a Jamaican court but a regional 
court  on  which  it  is  theoretically  possible  that  there  would  not  be  a  single 
judge of Jamaican nationality￿. 
 
It would be wise for those who only more lately have been seeking to champion the cause 
of sovereignty, to remember that Jamaica is a sovereign nation today because we on this 
side, did not doubt our capacity to be independent on our own.  We trusted the people to 
make  the  right  decision  in  the  referendum  of  1961.    Do  they  now  contend  that  the 
referendum was a wrong decision and that, without consulting the people, we should have 
continued on a federal path without national sovereignty? 
 
All this tells us that sovereignty is not the real issue.  From the reasons offered, we get the 
strong impression that what we are speaking of here, is not so much a matter of national 
sovereignty but of political destiny, and what we are playing out is not the strengthening of 
the  sovereignty  of  Jamaica,  but  fulfilling  the  political  destiny  of  an integrated Caribbean 
region.  This destiny is spelled out in the recent report of the West Indian commission, in 
which it is said, and I quote: 
 
  ￿The  case  for  the  CARICOM  Supreme  Court  with  both  a  general  appellate 
jurisdiction in substitution for the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council and an original regional one in respect of the interpretation and 
application of the Treaty of Chaguaramas is now overwhelming.  Indeed, it is 
fundamental to the process of integration itself￿. 
 
We have no quarrel with those who want to go in the direction of completing the integration 
process by taking it to the political level, but we do not wish to pursue this course, and it is 
for this reason that we differ.  By this position we mean no disrespect to our Caribbean 
sister states with whom we have had a strong record of cooperation at many levels for 30 
years.  It is not that by our stand we love them less, but that we love Jamaica more! 
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The Government of Jamaica does not have the credibility to convincingly deny that it is 
involved in the deception of moving undercover in a direction of political integration.  It is a 
government which practices deceit on a monstrous scale.  This last budget exercise was 
proof enough of that, to say nothing of all the cover-ups of massive corruption over the past 
decade.  The credibility factor is not on the side of the Prime Minister of Jamaica, especially 
when it is recognized that the Caribbean Court of Justice is the only institution left to be put 
in place to take the final step to political integration of the Caribbean states.  Everything else 





 (2)  Relevance of Court 
Perhaps the most dangerous reason advanced to support the Caribbean Court of Justice, is 
the argument which really lies at the heart of this matter, that an indigenous court is needed 
to ￿reflect the moral, social and economic imperatives of its people￿. 
 
There are universal values which our courts respect as the foundations of law and order, 
but there are other values which a devious political directorate can fashion to its own suit 
proclaiming then to be `in the public interest, or `public order￿ or for `public safety￿ as the 
case may be.  The Constitution of Jamaica is riddled with them.  The rights that we hold that 
have been provided in our constitution have been qualified by a greater right of the state to 
suspend our rights based on arguments of whether the action is in the public interest, public 
order,  or  public  safety,  as  the  case  may  be.    It  is  a  dangerous  thing.    These  are  the 
loopholes  which  facilitated  the  infamous  State  of  Emergency  in  1976.    It  is  this  loose 
framework of the value system which can be manipulated into law to provide legislative 
support in the name of what is proposed as the social good by whatever interpretation, to 
protect what is invoked as sovereignty by whatever definition.  It is nothing more than a 
Machiavellian opening for the means to be justified by the end. 
 
Our system of jurisprudence interprets the law based on the evidence presented in court, 
not by external circumstances flavoured by political will and spiced by emotional values.  
This is the system we now enjoy in our own courts and where our courts differ there has 
always been the comfort of appeal to the Privy Council.  No mere majority of politicians in   41
Parliament must be allowed the right to interfere with this system of jurisprudence without 
the specific consent of the people. 
 
The highest form of justice is most assured when the judge does not know prosecutor or 
prosecuted, petitioner or respondent, and when the judge is a stranger to the politicians in 
the state in which the offense before the court was committed.  This is so with the Privy 
Council. 
 
We  are  far  from  sure  that  this  form  of  justice  would  rule  when  fraternal  relations  are 
inescapable in a small society and when the surroundings in which findings are made can 
influence the judgment of law. 
 
(3)  Cost 
It is contended that the cost of a Caribbean Court of Justice will be cheaper for litigants 
although it will be costly to sponsoring governments. 
 
The lower cost to appellants, as contended, is misleading.  While it is true that travel costs 
in the Caribbean would be less than to England where the Privy Council presides, most 
appeals to the Privy Council involve criminal charges and are defended at no cost, or at 
greatly reduced cost, courtesy of the conscientious English bar.   
 
But then, what is the true cost of justice?  Ask any accused, or appellant, if costly justice of 
quality is more desirable than cheaper justice which is suspect or riddled with injustice! 
 
The cost factor which is more relevant is the operational expense of the CCJ.  On the one 
hand, the Privy Council provides its services free of cost to participating governments.  The 
CCJ is expected to be a costly exercise.  To overcome this, US$100 million is being raised 
by the Caribbean Development Bank to be vested in a trust from which the investment 
interest yielded will operate the court.  But no itemization of the expected expenditure has 
been  disclosed  despite  requests,  leaving  open  the  question  as  to  whether  the  funding 
arrangements are sufficient. 
 
What is more important to the question of financing, are the appalling conditions of the local 
courts  and  their  operations.    Parish  courts  are  without  up-to-date  sets  of  the  laws  of   42
Jamaica  and  subsidiary  legislation,  as  well  as  reports  from  other  relevant  judicial 
systems.  Buildings are in many cases without basic facilities and in need of urgent repairs.  
Transcription  equipment  is  a  rarity,  delaying  verbatim  reports  on  cases,  sometimes  for 
years.  Training of staff is deficient.   
 
The  question  is  asked  why  then  enter  into  substantial  additional  expenditure  on  a  new 
judicial system for which an excellent system is already in existence at the Privy Council, 
instead of properly refurbishing the local courts and providing the necessary equipment and 
working libraries required to ensure justice? 
 
Why ask?  The present government believes in building new highways while local roads are 
in desperate need of repairs. 
 
(4)  Independence from Political Influence 
In the original model of the CCJ as discussed in 1988, there was no provision to insulate the 
appointment of judges from political influence.  This was the original objection voiced by me 
at  that  time.    Other  voices  were  added  and,  over  time,  new  proposals  have  been 
incorporated  by  which  seemingly  non-political  procedures  have  been  introduced  for 
selecting members of the Regional and Judicial Services Commission which will regulate 
the Caribbean Court of Justice.  This will go a long way, if not all the way.  But a problem 
still remains. 
 
The objection to political connections in the administration of justice requires no need for 
justification.  It is a factor which despite all the insulation of the appointment of judges which 
is being built into the system, the spectre of a political shadow will still haunt the court. 
The commonly expressed disagreement of the Government of Jamaica with the handling by 
the privy council regarding appeals against convictions on charges of capital murder which 
provide  for  the  penalty  of  capital  punishment  by  hanging,  have  sent  a  strong  signal  of 
dissatisfaction by government and desire for a different court which will satisfy the political 
will  of  government  for  prompt  hangings.    To  bolster  the  argument  of  a  defaulting  Privy 
Council, reasoning is advanced that the Privy Council is against hanging and this position is 
contrary to public preference in Jamaica.  Hence, the need for a new court which will be 
more compliant to the political will, the Caribbean Court of Justice. 
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This is deliberately misleading.  The government is fully aware that the Privy Council has 
upheld convictions on hanging on many occasions.  What the Privy Council requires is that 
all courses of appeal to other bodies should first be exhausted before the Privy Council 
hearing of the appeal. 
 
To fully exhaust the various bodies which hear appeals can take several years during which 
the convicted prisoner could complete the five year limit set by the Privy Council in the Pratt 
and Morgan case for any convicted person to spend on death row.  As a result, some 
sentences  of  capital  punishment  handed  down  by  the  court  in  Jamaica  have  not  been 
fulfilled. 
 
Having regard to the fact that because of lack of staff and equipment some two years of the 
overall period of appeal are generally required to complete the time consuming process of 
preparation of the notes of trial, government cannot properly justify its stand against the 
Privy Council and could be using failure to effectively implement the popular call for hanging 
to bolster its case to remove the privy council as Jamaica￿s final Court of Appeal. 
 
The  credibility  of  the  campaign  by  government  to  remove  the  Privy  Council  is  further 
weakened by the loaded statement of Prime Minister P.J. Patterson in which he flexes his 
political muscles on the judicial system in an assertion that he would not ￿allow any group 
anywhere under the guise of judicial (hearings) making decisions that make policy decision 
on  social  matters  that  are  the  prerogative  of  Jamaica  as  a  sovereign  and  independent 
country￿. 
 
The  ￿social￿  issue  in  question  in  this  case,  is  the  matter  of  appeals  against  capital 
punishment which is, first and foremost, a legal matter.  As such the issue lies well beyond 
the powers of the Prime Minister to determine.  The very same political interference with the 
judicial system, regarding which I expressed fears in 1988, is apparently still in place as 
threatened by the Prime Minister of Jamaica:  no matter how insulated the appointment of 
judges will be he will ￿not allow￿ them to interfere in his ￿social￿ policy positions, using his 
definition of ￿social￿. 
 
The  sinister  record  of  the  Peoples  National  Party  in  matters  of  justice  is  part  of  the 
consciousness of many Jamaicans who fear the devious tactics of PNP governments in   44
depriving them of their fundamental rights and freedoms.  This real or perceived political 
signal of interference is in keeping with the fundamental fear that it could be manifest reality.  
This is one of the deep feelings in the country which fuel the view that retention of the Privy 
Council, which is beyond political manipulation, is essential to our future support. 
 
The people of this country should have every reason to expect that the justice system can 
still be manipulated by men who put politics first.  We must never forget the infamous gun 
court  which  was  established  by  manipulation  of  the  justice  system  by  the  Manley 
Government in 1976 using magistrates, without security of tenure, to try gun crimes which 
should properly be heard by judges whose tenures office were secured.   
 
The Government of Jamaica should understand, therefore, that in the eyes of a great many 
Jamaicans it has little credibility as a defender of our fundamental rights and freedoms and 
that  it  is  under  great  suspicion  that,  given  an  opportunity  to  extract  political  gain,  it  will 
enforce its political will no matter how many layers of insulation from political interference is 
built into the administrative structure of the Caribbean Court.  That is why we will continue to 
support the Privy Council as our final Court of Appeal. 
 
(5)  Improvement to the Judicial System 
The  fundamental  question  is  whether  the  Caribbean  Court  of  Justice  would  offer  an 
improvement to the services provided by the judicial committee of the Privy Council.  No 
one can contend that this is the case. 
 
The Privy Council consists of the highest calibre of the British judiciary and other invited 
heads of judiciaries in the commonwealth who together comprise a wealth of erudition and 
experience that is unmatched in our system of justice anywhere.  And its administration 
costs Jamaica nothing. 
Jamaicans of all walks of life have a deep respect for the quality of justice of the Privy 
Council, a status which any new court may or may not achieve and, in any event only over 
decades of practice. 
 
The  reputation  of  the  Privy  Council  is  a  lynch-pin  of  great  importance  to  agreements 
between foreign and Jamaican entities, for those foreign entities, who, through unfamiliarity, 
are not convinced of the reputation of Jamaican courts to provide the quality of justice they   45
expect, recourse to the Privy Council is the comfort that satisfies their concerns about 
hearing  disputes  in  this  jurisdiction.    Recourse  to  the  Privy  Council  provides  the  glue, 
without which, many substantial agreements would never hold. 
 
I shudder to think what the reaction would be on future agreements if contracting parties are 
told that disputes would be handled by an unknown, untried CCJ. 
 
(6)  Permanence of the Caribbean Court of Appeal 
There  is  one  further  point  of  great  importance  to  assess.    How  permanent  will  be  the 
Caribbean Court of Justice? 
 
It is not intended, so far, by government that the CCJ should be established by way of 
entrenchment in the constitution.  Entrenchment, to whatever degree would require political 
cooperation and, possibly, a referendum in which the people would decide. 
 
The  intention  of  government is to avoid putting the issue to the people as a safeguard 
against rejection by the people. 
The  CCJ  can  be  established  by  a  simple  majority  vote  in  each  House  of  Parliament.  
Government proposes to take this course.  It is fraught with danger and is self-defeating. 
 
Such  a  court  can  have  no  permanency  as  by  the  same  simple  majority  Jamaica￿s 
participation can be withdrawn.  In these circumstances a court of this nature would be 
vulnerable to real or perceived threats of dissolution, leaving it open to fear and favour. 
 
The strength of the highest court must rest in its impregnable position from all conditions 
which can unduly influence it.  This can only be assured by entrenching its position in the 
constitution  so  that  it  cannot  be  affected  by  a  simple  majority  vote  in  Parliament  for 
establishment or dissolution. 
 
The impact on the credibility of a Caribbean Court of Justice which is enacted by simple 
majority goes further.  As the highest court of appeal in the system it must have maximum 
protection for the security of tenure of its judges.   
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This is not the case.  Judges of the Jamaican Court of Appeal can be removed from office 
only the elaborate provisions of section 105 of the constitution which requires concurrence 
of the Privy Council.  The section is entrenched giving permanence to the protection it offers 
to  judges.    No  such  provision  exists  for  judges  in  the  Carib  Court  which  is  itself  not 
entrenched. 
 
This  is  a  highly  undesirable  condition  which  will  expose  judges  in  the  CCJ  to  real  or 
perceived threats of dismissal. 
 
The spectre of the highest court in the system existing in a precarious structure while lesser 
courts enjoy constitutional permanence tells us that this perverted arrangement has been 
designed to fulfill a purpose regardless of the anomaly it generates and the abomination 
which it creates.  It will carry the status, by reality or perception, of a weak, hybrid specie of 
a true court. 
 
In  all  these  circumstances  the  proposed  Caribbean  Court  of  Justice has little footing of 
support: 
-  Contrary to its proclaimed purpose, it is not an instrument of sovereignty for it 
will be attached to no sovereign nation; 
-  It maybe an instrument to fulfill the destiny in the political integration of the 
Caribbean, but, from all sides, we are not going in that direction; 
-  It  cannot  fulfill  the  ￿moral,  social  and economic imperatives of the people￿ 
unless it bastardizes itself, in which case it is half a court and half something 
else; 
-  Its provision of cheaper justice for litigants is beneficial only to some.  To the 
state it is a costly exercise with an upside-down priority of spending where 
there is no urgent necessity and neglecting where appalling local conditions 
dictate an urgent need; 
-  Its  independence  is  compromised  by  lack  of  protection  from  political 
interference on the threat of easy removal of judges; 
-  It offers no improvement to a judicial system built around an appellate court 
with an honoured tradition of justice which cannot be replaced; 
-  Its permanence as a judicial body, which permanence is a necessity if justice 
is to be served, is easily dissolved ￿ here today, gone tomorrow.   47
 
In brief, there are no real convincing arguments for the establishment of a Caribbean Court 
of Justice.  It will introduce, at this time, greater uncertainty than the great uncertainty which 
already exists amidst an economy which is out of control and a society which is falling apart. 
 
In those circumstances, if the government persists in participating in the Caribbean Court of 
Justice then the people must be consulted.  The Opposition will not accept any other course 
than to be guided by the people in a referendum.  If a referendum is refused, the Opposition 
will withdraw Jamaica as a participating state whenever the opportunity arises and abandon 
the Caribbean Court of Justice.  Let the people speak. 
 
The decision at hand is the most far-reaching for Jamaicans since the people were asked to 
determine their future in 1961.  Accordingly, I move the following amendment: 
Amendment to Resolution 
 
  Whereas the General Election to the House of Representatives was duly held on 
October 16, 2002; 
 
And whereas at that election it was not an issue whether or not the Government of 
Jamaica should participate in the Caribbean Court of Justice; 
 
And whereas the resolution before the House of Representatives now seeks to ratify 
an agreement for Jamaica to become a participant in the proposed court; 
 
And whereas grave doubts have now been publicly expressed as to whether Jamaica 
should participate in the Caribbean Court of Justice; 
 
And whereas it is right and proper that the people of Jamaica should be accorded an 
opportunity of expressing their opinion on this issue separately and apart from any 
other; 
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Be  it  resolved  that  government  agrees  to  the  holding  of  a  referendum  to  seek 
guidance from the people and to act in accordance with the views of the people on 




There has been no more sinister attempt to subjugate our system of justice and to subvert 
the rights of the people, than this attempt to unleash on an unsuspecting people a lesser 
breed of justice which can be molded in the shape of the political will. 
 
I do not care what political persuasion binds any man who may hope for advantage, or fear 
the disadvantage, of a political court of justice.  I know that deep in their minds, they are 
suspicions that a court which has no true independence is a threat to themselves and future 
generations and that they feel in their hearts that it is not right to usurp the judicial process 
in  a  manner which can imperil their future and the future of their children born and yet 
unborn. 
 
Let us not believe that the people are ignorant of the need for more, not less, justice.  The 
infamous events of this decade, tells us that there is no weaker link in the political fabric of 
our society than the quality of justice. 
 
These  are  days  when  every  device  is  used  to  exploit  every loophole that will allow the 
assumption of even greater political power over the people and abuse them of their rights.  
We  must  not  allow  a  government  which  already fully controls all the centers of political 
power and weaves vast influence over the forces of law and order, to have any further 
extension on their grasp on our lives through a system of dubious justice which can allow 
greater political empowerment to threaten our fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
We will not accept that after all the epic struggles at the end of the thirties for workers rights, 
the fifties for independence rights, and the seventies to protect our society from an alien 
ideology,  each  a  generation  apart,  that,  at  this  time,  the  beginning  of  the  first  new 
generation of this century, we should see the doors of the highest form of justice being 
slammed in our faces.   49
 
In 1962, the people of Jamaica did not intend that one set of masters should be changed for 
another.  It was their expectation that the colonial masters would leave and we the people 
would be our own masters. 
 
To ensure this, we must have recourse at all times to the highest form of justice on which 
we can rely so that no new masters can subvert our inalienable fundamental rights and 
freedoms. 
 
Let the people speak; if it is all so good, let the people speak.  Let the people be polled in a 
referendum on the type of justice they want.  Only the people can decide so fundamental a 
matter as to whether this country in which we live, is one in which freedom will run like a 
river and justice like an everlasting stream.  Let the people speak! 
 